OR
introduction
Drug trafficking is a serious problem on a global scale that plagues both producing countries and transit and consumer countries, creating a black market that moves millions of dollars each year, and thus constituting a fundamental source of income for thousands of of criminal groups throughout the planet. In this writing, we have proposed to briefly deal with some aspects of this phenomenon in Southeast Asia, specifically Myanmar and South Vietnam (before reunification), especially in relation to the power dynamics between the State and producer groups. with the black market, and the successive US interferences designed to economically strengthen groups related to their political objectives. Western imperialist powers have already set a precedent in the use of drug trafficking for their own benefit, as happened with Great Britain and the opium trade in China.
This had a double effect desired by the British Empire, that of weakening China, as well as that of providing a very considerable income to the imperial coffers, all at the cost of the suffering of tens of thousands of Chinese. This has already led to two wars, from which the Western powers emerged the winners by obtaining important conditions, resulting in a loss of China's sovereignty over its territory and its commercial capabilities1.
II. The case of Myanmar
The first case we will look at is that of Myanmar (formerly known as Burma), where the seed of large-scale drug trafficking was planted in the 1950s by the Kuomintang. Even before his arrival there was poppy cultivation (of the papaver somniferum variety) mainly in the small feudal kingdoms of the Shan state, but when the KMT troops fled after their defeat in the Chinese civil war in 1949, some units that isolated in Yunnan settled in the region bordering China, the aforementioned Shan state, in January 1950. With support from Thailand and the US, the number of troops grew to 4,000-6,000 troops2, in most of cases recruited from border areas. As early as late 1951, the CIA was organizing trips from Taipei to the Mong Hsat airstrip. In the late 1950s, opium production was between 300 and 600 tons3. Between 1950 and 1952 the KMT in Myanmar tried to invade China seven times, all attempts being repelled. The Burmese government sent troops to expel these occupants with little success, after which Prime Minister U Nu took the matter to the United Nations. Despite this, the number of KMT troops grew to 12,000 by the end of 1953. The Burmese troops managed, however, to dislodge some enemy units, who settled in the Wa and Kokang regions, the most suitable for poppy cultivation, allying with local groups dedicated to the production of opium and exporting their production to Thailand and Taiwan for later release. This narcotics movement caused a scandal in Thailand, since it involved a high-ranking general allied with the CIA, and caused recrimination from the international community4.
In the mid-to-late 1950s, many Burmese troops entered the Shan state, and in the 1960s, Myanmar's military dictator Ne Win provided the pro-government militias (KKY) with ample resources, as well as permits to when distributing opium from the region, in order to make these armed groups self-sufficient in their fight against local warlords. This tactic failed, as the KKY allied itself with local factions in order to maximize profits, for which they were dissolved in 1973. Following the 1988 pro-democracy protests, the Burmese state signed an agreement with various rebel groups , according to which they would be granted immunity when dealing with opium in exchange for the cessation of hostilities towards the government. As a result, opium production increased from 836 tons in 1987 to 2,340 tons in 1995. Gradually, through agreements, a semblance of stability has been achieved in Myanmar by integrating the rebels, illegal opium producers, into the military political apparatus. This is how the Burmese state has managed to use the drug trafficking industry in its country to its advantage, strengthening itself with the use of opium as what P. Meehan calls a limited access good, which the government uses to favor its allies and punish to his enemies. Therefore, we can see that the rapid increase in opium production, indirectly facilitated by the CIA, has been assimilated in Myanmar as an integral part of political life in the relations between the central government and peripheral regions5.
III. The case of South Vietnam
Vietnam has not produced local opium production, so opium has traditionally been imported from the Golden Triangle (the border region between Myanmar, Laos and Thailand). From this area there are two main routes, the most important of which starts in the Shan mountains and follows a highway from Bangkok, passing from there to the international market, especially Hong Kong, and another route, the one that concerns us in this section, which consists of an air corridor between the clandestine airstrips of northern Laos and the international airport of Saigon. Saigon shipped most of the heroin destined for the European and US markets, at least in the decades before the reunification of Vietnam, when South Vietnam existed as a satellite state of the US. During the 1950s and 1960s, members Intelligence agents, in many cases collaborating with the CIA, were employed by the South Vietnamese government to serve as liaisons between Lao growers and South Vietnamese authorities, who used profits from the opium trade to finance their opium trade. fight against the Vietcong, in many cases making use of the national air forces to transport this merchandise6. The head of the intelligence apparatus of the South Vietnamese regime, Tran Kim Tuyen, was in charge of all this, who was in charge of arranging these flights, under the pretext of intelligence operations, as well as creating extensive espionage networks, which in South Vietnam were able to reach up to 100,000 people. After General Nguyen Khanh's coup d'état, the police apparatus set up by President Diem was temporarily lost, and control over the opium trade and other forms of corruption8 was decentralized.
However, under Prime Minister Ky, the previous system of internal security was redeveloped, and opium was again turned to for funding to fight the insurgency in South Vietnam. In the 1970s, type 4 heroin laboratories were established in Southeast Asia, with the help of scientists brought in from Hong Kong. This heroin was purer than type 3, which was previously produced there, and the beginning of its production corresponded with an increase in demand in both the local and US markets. A huge number of American soldiers, between 10 and 14 percent, began using this heroin, which was aggressively sold to the military by the local population. Many thought this was a tactic by the North Vietnamese government, but a US military investigation in 1971 concluded that what little opium was grown in North Vietnam was strictly controlled by the government and was used exclusively for the production of medicines. . Instead, this report accused very important sectors of the South Vietnamese government (especially the army, the air force, the police and the lower house of the National Assembly) of being the main promoters and protectors of this opium trade, since, Despite damaging their interests by weakening the army of their American allies, the amount of money they earned was too tempting in such an impoverished country. This continued until reunification, and so we can see how the US government has tolerated and even financed a government that was deeply involved in drug trafficking, including to the US, putting its imperialist interests ahead of the well-being of its own army and citizens9.
In both cases, that of South Vietnam and Myanmar, we have been able to verify that the US government has had no scruples in maintaining and financing allies whose main economic livelihood was opium, even to the detriment of the Western population. who consumed these narcotics, and whom in theory they sought to protect, at least in official rhetoric. Thus we see that the only concern of the United States government in this region has been the strategic opposition to communism and the anti-imperialist struggle for national liberation, regardless of the tactics used to achieve self-sufficiency for its allies, which would later end up creating problematic situations in the entire region with respect to which each local government has had to position itself, either assimilating the power dynamics of opium production as happened in Myanmar, or limiting production as in the case of unified Vietnam. Likewise, the CIA's complicity in drug trafficking was not and is not limited to Southeast Asia, they have also had links to the financing and support of the Afghan mujahideen and the Nicaraguan contras, involved in the production of opium and cocaine, respectively. Such is the importance of these operations for the United States, that in 2009 the head of the UNODC, Antonio María Costa, stated that it was mainly the money from drug trafficking that kept the US financial system afloat during the 2008 crisis. , reaching an estimate that 352 billion dollars from drug trafficking had been laundered by major US banks10. All this, in short, shows us the scale of the implications that the global drug trade has for the financing and power of imperialism, and can therefore be considered inherent to it.
Conclusions
Footnotes
1 Embid, A. (2010). The war on drugs fraud. Two historical examples: China and Vietnam. Weapons Against Wars Bulletin.
2 Lintner, B. (1984). The Shans and the Shan State of Burma. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 5(4), p. 409.
3 Meehan, P. (2011). Drugs, insurgency and state-building in Burma: Why the drug trade is central to Burma's changing political order. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 42(3), p. 381.
4 Lintner, B. (1984), op. cit., p. 409-411.
5 Meehan, P. (2011), op. cit., p. 382.
6 McCoy, A.W., Read, C.B., & Adams, L.P. (1972). The politics of heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 98-99.
7 McCoy, AW, Read, CB, & Adams, LP (1972), op. cit., p. 102.
8 McCoy, AW, Read, CB, & Adams, LP (1972), op. cit., p. 104.
9 McCoy, AW, Read, CB, & Adams, LP (1972), op. cit., p. 115.
10 Syal, R. (12/13/2009). Drug money saved banks in global crisis, claims UN advisor. TheGuardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global/2009/dec/13/drug-money-banks-saved-un-cfief-claims
Bibliographic references
Embid, A. (2010). The war on drugs fraud. Two historical examples: China and Vietnam. Weapons Against Wars Bulletin.
Lintner, B. (1984). The Shans and the Shan State of Burma. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 5(4), 403-450.
McCoy, A.W., Read, C.B., & Adams, L.P. (1972). The politics of heroin in Southeast Asia.
Meehan, P. (2011). Drugs, insurgency and state-building in Burma: Why the drug trade is central to Burma's changing political order. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 42(3), 376-404.
Syal, R. (12/13/2009). Drug money saved banks in global crisis, claims UN advisor. TheGuardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global/2009/dec/13/drug-money-banks-saved-un-cfief-claims